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1 Abstract
Why do people support repressive and authoritarian leaders? In many Latin Amer-
ican countries, as well as other countries around the world, people vote for and sup-
port leaders who have infringed on their human rights. In 1973, Augusto Pinochet
staged a coup in Chile and seized power for over sixteen years. Although Pinochet’s
regime was brutal and repressive, numerous Chilean citizens still profess their sup-
port for him. This paper investigates the variables that predict support for Pinochet
in Chile. This is done using surveys carried out in 1988, 1991, and 1999 by the
Centro de Estudios Pu´blicos in Chile. The correlates of support for Pinochet are
investigated using an ordinary least squares regression model. This work finds that
preferring authority/order over liberty drives support for Pinochet more significantly
than demographic variables and concern for unemployment. Concerns over crime or
corruption seem to drive support for Pinochet to a lesser extent. Further, this paper
finds that demographic variables and concerns for crime, corruption, or unemploy-
ment do not consistently predict preference for authority/order. Recent research
suggests that economic and social polarization as well as uncertainty drive support
for authoritarians. However, the results presented in this paper suggest that the
people who support Pinochet could be doing so because they simply prefer author-
itarian forms of government over democratic ones on an ideological level.
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2 Introduction
When General Augusto Pinochet died in 2006, thousands of people gathered to
mourn their beloved dictator. Signs bearing “Gracias General” and “Libertador de
Chile” were sported and many tears were shed at the general’s funeral. Simultan-
eously, large masses of protesters attended the event and the government refused
to sanction a state funeral and recognize Pinochet as a head of state. This scene
highlights the deep polarization in Chile over Pinochet’s legacy. While some people
remember Pinochet as a brutal dictator, others believe that “Pinochet saved the
lives of an entire generation” by preventing the consolidation of a Marxist regime
in Chile (Long, 2013). Some view him as a violator of human rights, while others
characterize his regime as the foundation upon which Chile’s economic, social, and
political stability rests. The case of Augusto Pinochet in Chile poses a puzzle: Why
do some people support and even praise a dictator whose regime violated the human
rights of the citizens it claimed to protect?
Support for authoritarian leaders is not unique to Chile and the case of Pinochet,
but a widespread phenomenon. Recent literature attempting to explain support for
authoritarians has been focused on two main explanations. The first, championed by
Milan Svolik and Daron Acemoglu, emphasizes political and economic interests in
predicting support for authoritarians. Svolik (2018) claims that polarization causes
people to be more tolerant of authoritarian policies when those policies are being
carried out by candidates of their respective parties. That is, people place a greater
emphasis on party loyalty than they do on their self-reported support for democracy.
Acemoglu et al. (2013), in investigating why voters dismantle checks and balances,
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propose yet another polarization-based explanation for the popularity of authorit-
arians. They posit that reducing checks and balances makes it easier for the elite
sector in a society to buy political influence. Thus, a society that suffers from more
economic inequality and has a stronger elite segment is less likely to have checks and
balances. Since checks and balances make a government less authoritarian, Acemo-
glu et al. (2013) argue that economic polarization leads to more authoritarian gov-
ernance. This conclusion reinforces the idea that authoritarian support stems from
social divisions and from voters caring principally about sectarian interests. The
second explanation, posited by the work of Monika Nalepa, attributes people’s en-
dorsement of authoritarian incumbents to their uncertainty regarding whether these
leaders will carry out autocratic policies once in office (Nalepa et al., 2018).
These two explanations are insufficient in the case of Pinochet. While there could
be economic preferences driving people to support Pinochet, these do not seem to be
the only or even the most important factors. First, the wealthy were not as powerful
in Chile as they were in many other Latin American countries before or immediately
after Pinochet’s regime. Further, some of the people that seem to support Pinochet
were actually hurt by his economic policies. Pinochet’s neoliberal economic agenda
widened the wealth gap in Chile, which hurt the middle class, one of Pinochet’s
original bases of support. As for the theory related to uncertainty, Pinochet was
widely supported in Chile after his regime ended and even after he was publicly
arrested and charged with crimes against humanity. He remains popular even today!
Uncertainty about Pinochet’s policies cannot be driving people to support him since
it is clear that his regime was brutal and unequivocally authoritarian.
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I propose that support for authoritarianism is a variable that can be disassociated
from demographic and economic variables. This paper seeks to test that hypothesis
by examining the case of Chile, for reasons explained in section 5. I do so by analyzing
data from surveys acquired from “El Centro de Estudios Pu´blicos” (translated as
the Center for Public Studies) and conducted in 1988, 1991, and 1999. Using a
regression analysis I find that having a favorable opinion of Pinochet, in all three
survey years, is predicted by supporting authority and order over liberty. I find that
same effect when controlling for socioeconomic status, education, age, gender, and a
concern for unemployment, crime, and corruption. Further, I do not find a consistent
correlation between support for Pinochet and any of the aforementioned demographic
variables. Preliminary results suggest that concern for crime and corruption might
also drive support for Pinochet, while concern for unemployment does not. Since
authority/order is the variable that correlates best with support for Pinochet, I
attempt to understand what predicts preference for authority. I find that none of
the variables representing demographics or political concerns drive preference for
authority and order. My results suggest that support for authoritarianism can exist
as a characteristic that is independent of demographic variables and of a perceived
threat from unemployment, corruption, or crime. My conclusion conflicts with the
literature suggesting that specific economic or social interests are the key drivers of
support for authoritarianism.
My conclusions are consistent with those of Seligson and Tucker (2005). Selig-
son and Tucker look into the factors driving people to vote for formerly repressive
authoritarian leaders in Russia and Bolivia. They ask whether people voting for
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former authoritarians are expressing disillusionment with their available options in
the democratic context, or whether they are casting a vote against democracy itself.
Their results indicate that the people in Bolivia and Russia are driven in their votes
for former authoritarians by a preference for authoritarianism. This conclusion con-
tradicts the research emphasizing economic or social polarization as the main drivers
of support for authoritarianism. The fact that they look at former authoritarians
also rules out the uncertainty hypothesis. The people voting former authoritarians
into office can have no doubt about the character of the leaders and regimes they are
supporting. My research adds to the analysis of Seligson and Tucker by providing
another case study, that of Augusto Pinochet, that confirms their results.
2.1 Outline
First the history of Chile will be discussed in order to provide context. This will
include a discussion of the Chilean government prior to Pinochet’s rule, mainly fo-
cusing on the election and administration of Salvador Allende. Then it will focus
on what Pinochet’s anti-democratic and economic policies were and on the repres-
sion carried out by his government. It will then lay out the circumstances of his
resignation and the aftermath of his rule.
This thesis will then analyze the literature surrounding support for authoritari-
anism. It will discuss in detail the concept of democratic backsliding and the main
theories behind it. It will also describe the leading theories on what drives the popu-
lace to support authoritarian rulers. It will then briefly move to illustrating the
work that has been done looking at support for Pinochet. This will be followed by a
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discussion of why Chile is an interesting case study to look at in this context.
Next the data and methodology used will be explained. This will then be followed
by a discussion of the results, their implications, and their limitations as well as
suggestions for future study.
3 The Rise and fall of Augusto Pinochet
3.1 Salvador Allende and the Socialist Movement in Chile
The Chilean political system was presided over by a presidential system for some,
but not all, of the twentieth century. Democracy in Chile faltered when General
Carlos Iba´n˜ez del Campo established a dictatorship from 1927-1931. Then, political
unrest caused by the great depression lead to the ouster of General del Campo. The
ouster led to a period of political instability characterized by coups and insurrections.
In 1938 Chile transitioned back to democracy with the election of Pedro Aguirre
Cerda from the Radical Party. Between the years of 1938 and 1952, the radical
party had a firm hold on the presidency (“This is Chile”, 2014). Following the
period of Radical Party domination, the electorate was divided roughly into thirds:
the socialist supporters of Salvador Allende, the Christian Democrat supporters of
Eduardo Frei, and the right-wing supporters of Arturo Alessandri. Alessandri won
the 1958 election, but his popularity faltered because his presidency was complicated
by natural disasters, including a large earthquake and a tsunami. Due to Alessandri’s
loss of support, Eduardo Frei was elected in 1964. His most noteworthy policies were
agrarian reform and the expropriation of the Chilean copper industry.
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Then, in 1970, Salvador Allende was elected to the Chilean presidency through a
wholly democratic process. He was elected by the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)
coalition, which was made up of the Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties, as
well as other leftist groups. Allende promised to build a socialist revolution through
democratic and constitutional means, which included the expansion of welfare and
government support of workers (Skidmore and Smith, 2010). His administration
nationalized mining and other major industries, expanded agrarian reforms, and
increased worker compensation. In the first year of his presidency, the economy
grew by 8% (“This is Chile”, 2014). However, in 1972 and 1973, Chile experienced
an intense economic crisis characterized by food shortages, strikes, and inflation
(Skidmore and Smith, 2010).
There is evidence that the economic crisis arose from US-led sabotage (Kornbluh,
2016). Following World War II, the United States was an active presence in Latin
American affairs. In order to triumph over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the
United States became concerned about the spread of communism in the western
hemisphere. With the rise of Allende, the US government was fearful that having a
socialist president would lead Chile to join the communist camp. US Secretary of
state, Henry Kissinger, is quoted as having said “I don’t see why we have to stand
by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people”
(Skidmore and Smith, 2010). Even President Richard Nixon famously said that the
United States would make the Chilean economy “scream” in order to destabilize
Allende’s allegedly communist government (Kornbluh, 2016). Following Allende’s
electoral victory, the United States attempted to undermine his presidency in mul-
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tiple ways. A few of the actions taken by Nixon’s administration included suspending
most of the economic aid to Chile and funding the political opposition groups within
the country (Kornbluh, 2016). While the policies of the Allende government most
likely played a role in the economic downturn of 1972 and 1973, the United States was
also partly responsible for Chile’s sinking economy. The economic maladies eroded
middle class support for Allende. By 1973, the Chilean left consisted only of the
urban working class while the right was made up of a cohesive upper class, middle
class sector groups, and militant lower-middle class activists (Skidmore and Smith,
2010).
3.2 Pinochet in Command
On September 11, 1973, Augusto Pinochet overthrew the democratically elected pres-
ident Salvador Allende. Pinochet was in power for about 16 years and, while the
exact number is unknown, thousands of people were killed, tortured, and abducted
by the regime (Allier-Montan˜o and Crenzel, 2016). Pinochet also dismantled some
of Chile’s “long-standing democratic institutions” (Kornbluh, 2016). He disbanded
the national congress and banned the established political parties. His government
also infringed on the peoples’ political civil rights including freedoms of expression,
information, and assembly. Political dissidents were imprisoned and gatherings dis-
banded, thus making it dangerous to participate in politics and express disapproval
of Pinochet’s regime. Pinochet established a state of siege, imposed a curfew, set
strict limits on the media, and outlawed unions and leftist parties (Skidmore and
Smith, 2010). He also passed a new constitution in 1980 that allowed him to remain
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in power for eight years.
Apart from dismantling existing democratic institutions, Pinochet established
the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), which was responsible for most of the
violence that took place under his government. By July of 1973, DINA had held
hundreds of Chilean citizens in detention centers, some of which were torture com-
pounds (Esberg, 2018). DINA was even responsible for the assassination of Orlando
Letelier, a former Allende minister, in Washington DC. Backlash from this assassin-
ation prompted Pinochet to replace DINA with the Center for National Intelligence
(CNI). The CNI continued detaining people for a short period, then focused on in-
telligence gathering, but ultimately returned to carrying out acts of oppression until
Pinochet stepped down from office (Esberg, 2018).
Despite the brutality of the military regime, Pinochet is thought by many to have
laid the foundation for Chile’s current institutional and economic strength. When
Pinochet took power in 1973, his economic policies consisted of reducing tariffs, de-
valuing the currency, and privatizing industries. During this time, unemployment
was still increasing, real wages were falling, and inflation remained at over 300 %
(Brender, 2010). In 1974, Pinochet’s government called in a group of advisors, edu-
cated at the University of Chicago, known as the Chicago Boys. Overall, the eco-
nomic recommendations of the Chicago Boys consisted of deregulation, privatization,
and other free-market policies. Under the guidance of the Chicago Boys, Pinochet
reduced tariffs and decreased spending on social services. He also carried out two
privatization processes. The first spanned from 1974-1978, and involved returning
firms seized by the state to its previous owners. The second consisted of dismantling
11
the “social property area” (Meller, 1993).
In 1975, there was still high inflation, unemployment, and poverty rates. The
economy did not see an upswing until 1977 to 1981, now termed the Miracle Years,
during which Chile saw high growth rates and more moderate inflation (Stern, 2006).
In 1983, there was a major recession that incited protests and after that, Pinochet’s
administration followed more pragmatic economic policies. Between 1990 and 1998,
Chile had an average of 5.6% GDP growth and a reduction of those living in poverty
in those years from 38.6% to 21.7% (Brender, 2010). Supporters of Pinochet attribute
Chile’s post-1990 economic growth to the foundation that was set by the dictator’s
government and that was later built upon by his successors.
Pinochet’s immediate successor was Patricio Aylwin. Aylwin’s economic policy
retained the features established by Pinochet. Aylwin’s successor was Eduardo Frei
Ruiz-Tagle, who also carried on with the policy of trade liberalization handed down
by Pinochet. Chile’s GDP grew by around 7% annually under Aylwin and by around
7.8% under Frei Ruiz-Tagle (“This is Chile”, 2014). Thus, Pinochet’s government
set the precedent for a new economic policy in Chile.
3.3 The Plebiscite and its Aftermath
The end of Pinochet’s authoritarian regime was surprisingly democratic. By 1985,
Pinochet had lost the support of the United States and by 1988 he bowed to interna-
tional pressure calling for his government to liberalize. Pinochet decided to conduct
a plebiscite to vote on whether or not he should remain in power. Voting “Yes”
on the plebiscite meant keeping Pinochet in power for eight more years. Pinochet’s
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opposition, composed of fourteen parties, united into one coalition and campaigned
for people to vote “No”. Pinochet, under international scrutiny, stepped down from
power peacefully, having lost the plebiscite with just a little under half of the vote.
However, the constitution he had drafted in 1980 allowed him to keep the position
of commander in chief of the army. In this manner, Pinochet managed to maintain
a hold on the Chilean military, judiciary, and legislature even after stepping down
from the presidency.
Following Pinochet’s removal from office, there were some modest attempts made
at transitional justice measures. In 1990, Aylwin established the National Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. Its aim was to investigate the murders and disappear-
ances carried out under the regime. Due to the influence of institutions still loyal
to Pinochet, the commission was not allowed to discuss the victims of human rights
violations that did not include death or disappearance. As a result, the report
produced by the commission left out the numerous instances of non-lethal torture
carried out by Pinochet’s government (“Truth Commission : Chile 90”, 2014). The
commission was also denied the right to subpoena government documents, making
its mission nearly impossible to fulfil (Collins et al., 2013). The National Truth
and Reconciliation Commission produced the Reittig Report in March of 1991. The
report recorded 3,428 cases of disappearances, tortures, killings, and kidnappings,
but modern sources suggest that the number of victims was much higher (“Truth
Commission : Chile 90”, 2014).
In 1998, Pinochet was arrested in London; a judge in Spain requested he be
extradited and tried for his use of torture against Spanish citizens. As a result,
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Pinochet was held under house arrest for a year and a half. Eventually, he was
deemed unfit to stand trial and in the year 2000 was allowed to return to Chile. Upon
his return to Chile, Pinochet was stripped of the immunity he had previously enjoyed
and was indicted. Nevertheless, the charges were suspended and later dismissed.
A second truth commission, named the Valech Commission, was attempted in
2004, more than a decade following Pinochet’s removal from power. It acknow-
ledged the victims of torture and political repression. Unfortunately, the testimonies
gathered by the commission were classified as confidential for 50 years and thus
inadmissible in court (“Commission of Inquiry : Chile 03”, 2014). The Valech Com-
mission was more successful than the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in that it acknowledged the thousands of torture victims that the earlier report ig-
nored. However, it failed in producing evidence that could be used to prosecute the
perpetrators of human rights violations under Pinochet’s regime. In 2005, Pinochet
was again indicted, but he died in 2006 without facing any punishment for the
atrocities committed during his time in power. While there were attempts at trans-
itional justice with the truth commissions, their reports were largely incomplete and
Pinochet died without ever facing legal ramifications for his crimes. As a result, the
people of Chile were not immediately forced to face the painful memories of their
dictatorship and were not granted an opportunity for retribution.
Some Chilean citizens deny that the human rights atrocities happened at all while
some maintain they were a necessary evil to propel the country forward. While sup-
port for Pinochet in Chile is not as strong as it used to be, there are many modern
examples of how his legacy remains strong. Many political figures are actually out-
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spoken about their support for Pinochet. For instance, a documentary glorifying the
dictatorship was screened in Chile in 2012. At the screening, the president of the
Union of Retired Officials of the National Defense (UNOFAR) made the following
statement: “Pinochet’s image has been defamed, and they have tried to destroy his
image. But I will reiterate, he was the best president in Chile and he is the one who
transformed Chile from being a poor country to the jewel of America” (Villarreal,
2012). Even a former Chilean President, Miguel Juan Sebastia´n Pin˜era, was pub-
licly against the arrest of Pinochet (Esberg, 2018). Despite reports citing his human
rights abuses and brutality, support for Pinochet is strong even today.
4 Explaining Support for Authoritarianism
Recent scholarship attempts to understand why voters choose to support leaders who
are subverting democracy. The literature often uses a simplified model to understand
the reasons people support authoritarian leaders. Generally, a person’s rationale falls
into one of two categories: either they support authoritarianism over democracy
as a whole system or they prefer the authoritarian leaders to the other options
available to them in their current democratic context. A significant body of research
addresses whether someone can be predisposed to supporting authoritarianism as
their preferred form of government. Two key papers on the subject of supporting
right-wing authoritarianism are found in Altemeyer (1996) and Feldman and Stenner
(1997). In his paper, Altemeyer claims support for authoritarianism is a socially
learned personality trait. Stevens et al. (2006) support this position by claiming
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they find that economic threat directly affects levels of authoritarian aggression.
They go on to then link levels of authoritarian aggression with a preference for order
over democracy. On the other hand, Feldman and Stenner posit there is no direct
effect of societal threat on authoritarian preference, but rather an interaction between
authoritarian predispositions and perceived threat. These are two of the most widely
cited theories attempting to explain whether the social environment gives rise to
authoritarian attitudes or whether having authoritarian leanings is more innate and
can be modified with environmental interactions.
Much of the research on support for authoritarian leaders is done in the context
of democratic backsliding. Democratic backsliding, as defined by Waldner and Lust
(2018), is a “deterioration of qualities associated with democratic governance, within
any regime.” Many of the researchers looking into democratic backsliding do so
in the context of a legitimately established government that rolls back democratic
guarantees while in power. This form of democratic backsliding is referred to as an
executive takeover. In this scenario, Waldner and Lust (2018) define backsliding as
the undermining of the principles of competition, participation, and accountability.
Executive takeovers are interesting to study because if people favor a democratic
system, it is hard to explain why they electorally support incumbents that erode
democracy. However, this type of democratic backsliding is difficult to study because
people may be voting for anti-democratic incumbents without being aware of the
threat these candidates pose to democracy.
The other way democratic backsliding can take place is through the forceful re-
moval of a democratically elected government, often through a military coup. Exec-
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utive takeovers entail a gradual degradation of democratic institutions by an elected
executive whereas military coups usually result in an abrupt rise to power of a right-
wing dictatorship. The latter form of democratic backsliding is the one that occurred
in the case of Chile.
Many theories have been posited to explain the phenomenon of democratic back-
sliding. Agency based theories place the blame on political entities acting under rel-
atively unconstrained situations. Political culture based theories posit that political
outcomes are a result of norms held by the populace. Theories of political economy
blame structural-economic factors for regime outcomes. Theories of social structure
and political coalitions assume democratic backsliding happens with the formation
of opposing groups and state that conflict can undermine democracy (Waldner and
Lust, 2018).
The influential work on democratic backsliding done by Milan Svolik (2018) falls
under the category of theories of social structure and political coalitions. His research
attempts to understand why people vote for incumbents that erode democracy. Start-
ing with a discussion of the work of Verba and Almond (1963), he claims research
into democratic backsliding has centered around the theory that when elites are kept
in check by a a voting public with strong democratic values, democracy is kept intact.
Svolik claims that this view is overly simplistic because it does not take into account
other factors such as political ideology. Instead, he proposes that polarization is a key
driver of decisions in a democratic context. He conducts an experiment in Venezuela
in which he confronts voters with a choice that pits their democratic values against
their partisan ones; he finds that people privilege their partisan interests over their
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democratic ones. People, he concludes, will turn their backs on their pro-democratic
beliefs if it allows them to continue supporting their party of choice.
These findings are validated by the work of Graham and Svolik (2019). In this
paper, Graham and Svolik survey American citizens to test whether support for
democracy is flexible. They claim that Americans will prioritize their partisan in-
terests over their democratic ones. They also conclude that since polarization can
lead to the acceptance of democratic backsliding, centrists are a democratizing force.
Nalepa et al. (2018) build on the theory of how political polarization can drive
support for authoritarians. They concur with Svolik (2018) and Graham and Svolik
(2019) and add that democratic backsliding can also happen in a context in which
voters explicitly claim they would not support an authoritarian candidate. Nalepa
et al. (2018) claim that this phenomenon can occur because voters usually do not
know how authoritarian the administration of a proposed candidate will actually be.
Looking at the Polish government’s attempts to reform the judiciary, they extend
the analysis of Svolik (2018) in saying that the degree of polarization necessary for
voters to support authoritarianism depends on the uncertainty they have about the
incumbent.
Acemoglu et al. (2013) present their own findings about the importance of polariz-
ation in supporting authoritarian forms of government. They do so by investigating
why voters dismantle checks and balances. Acemoglu et al. (2013) posit that re-
ducing checks and balances makes it easier for the elite sector in a society to buy
political influence. If a society suffers from more economic inequality, it is likely
to have a strong elite that will favor having fewer checks and balances. More eco-
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nomic polarization, they conclude, leads to the establishment of more authoritarian
policies within a government. This conclusion reinforces the idea that authoritarian
support stems from social divisions and from voters caring principally about their
sectarian interests. This line of thinking is congruent with the works of Lipset (1959)
in which he warns of the perils of a bipolar society and states the importance of a
strong middle class. The discussed works overall reinforce a view about support for
authoritarianism that rests on political and economic polarization.
These theories do not neatly explain the case of support for Augusto Pincohet.
First, Chile did not have the same degree of economic and social polarization that was
seen in other Latin American countries when Pinochet came to power. Moreover,
using data from the 1995-2009 Latinobaro´metro Survey, we see that there is no
significant difference between preferences for democracy at different socioeconomic
levels in Chile (Barozet, 2011). On average, between 1995 and 2009, 51% of the
lower, 55% of the middle, and 59% of the upper class in Chile stated that democracy
is preferable to other forms of government (See Table 1). This data suggests that in
Chile, there is no single social class that supports authoritarianism more strongly.
Additionally, the middle class in Chile was instrumental in the overthrow of Allende
in 1973. Middle class sector groups and more militant lower middle class activists
were a part of the right wing coalition protesting against Allende’s policies, which
does not support the theories emphasizing the democratizing influence of the middle
class (Bello, 2016). Theories emphasizing social and economic polarization as drivers
of support for authoritarianism do not explain Pinochet’s popularity.
In contrast to theories focusing on polarization as drivers of democratic back-
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Table 1: Democracy preference in Chile by SES
Year Lower Class Middle Class Upper Class
1995 50 55 56
1996 49 57 58
1997 60 65 62
1998 49 53 56
1999 48 56 61
2000 43 49 52
2001 49 53 57
2002 48 52 61
2003 51 58 64
2004 50 66 68
2005 61 51 67
2006 48 49 46
2007 44 53 59
2008 67 59 65
2009 51 55 69
Percentage of people that said democracy is preferable to any other form of govern-
ment stratified by socioeconomic status. The data comes from the Latino´barometro
surveys and was compiled by Barozet (2011).
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sliding, Seligson and Tucker (2005) propose that preference for authority and order
is a category that is independent of economic and partisan concerns. They study
why people chose to vote for Banzer in Bolivia, a former military dictator, and for
Zyuganov in Russia, the candidate for the communist party. They test two hypo-
theses: The first is that people who report a preference for authoritarianism are more
likely to support ex-authoritarian parties. The second is that voters who support
authoritarians claim to be committed to democracy but believe the incumbent party
failed to provide the country with important goods. Their findings support the first
hypothesis, which is consistent with the idea that people are disillusioned with demo-
cracy as an institution and are seeking the perceived stability that authoritarianism
would provide. They use a binomial logit regression to study the drivers of the vote
for the former authoritarians. They examine whether preferring order and author-
ity over democracy predicts the vote more strongly than demographic variables and
concerns over unemployment, corruption, and crime. The reason they test crime
and corruption specifically is that many studies have found that residents in recently
democratized countries perceive a worsening in crime and corruption.
They find a significant relationship between voting for Banzer and being older,
unemployed, a victim of corruption, and a supporter of both dictatorship over demo-
cracy and order over liberty. In Russia, they find similar factors driving the support
for a former communist leader, Zyuganov, but they also find that dissatisfaction with
the current economic state was significant. Seligson and Tucker (2005) claim that the
commonality between the Russian and Bolivian case is a strong effect of preference
for authoritarianism on vote choice. Their results suggest that the people in Bolivia
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and Russia were driven in their votes for former authoritarians by a preference for
authoritarianism more so than by any other variable.
5 Applying the Question to the Chilean Case
In this paper, I focus on support for an authoritarian leader who has perpetrated a
clearly anti-democratic coup. Examples of military governments perpetrating coups,
establishing authoritarian regimes, and retaining popular support permeate the his-
tory of Latin America. During the twentieth century, a wave of repressive dictator-
ships arose in much of Latin America, characterized by human rights violations and
state terror. Economic and social instability led to the rise of authoritarian lead-
ers including, but not limited to, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo
in the Dominican Republic, and Hugo Banzer in Bolivia. Despite atrocious human
rights records, representatives of some of those regimes were later elected to office in
democratic proceedings. For example, following the democratization of Argentina,
Antonio Bussi, Jose´ David Ruiz Palacios, and Roberto Ulloa (former military gov-
ernors), Aldo Rico (a leader of military rebellions), and Luis Patti (a former police
officer accused of torture), were elected to mayoral and gubernatorial positions (Se-
ligson and Tucker, 2005). In Chile, those who support Pinochet are aware of the
authoritarian and repressive nature of his regime but continue to hold a favorable
opinion of his rule.
This poses the question of whether the people of Latin America support author-
itarians as an opposition to democracy or due to a lack of better options within
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the democratic system. The former explanation, as argued by Lagos (2001), seems
to be supported by popular opinion survey data. For example, the Latinobaro´metro
reports that in 2018, only 58% of the Chilean population expressed support for demo-
cracy. Simultaneously, the report shows that 23% of the Chilean people surveyed in
2018 thought that an authoritarian government might be preferable to their current
one. The people from other Latin American countries included in the survey held
similar views. These astounding figures suggest that the disenchantment with gov-
ernments in Latin America might be dampening people’s hopes about the viability
and benefits of democracy.
Chile is often lauded as one of Latin America’s more stable and prosperous na-
tions (BBC, 2018). By searching through testimony in newspapers and magazines,
it becomes apparent that those who support Pinochet often cite Chile’s economic
success as a reason for its prosperity and attribute that success to the dictator. An-
gell (1993) writes that one possible explanation for Chile’s economic success in 1993
is that the government continued the policies implemented under Pinochet. One of
Pinochet’s supporters, Fernando Alessandri, summarizes that point as such:
“The Pinochet regime has many mistakes, very serious mistakes, but these are
mistakes that should always be kept in perspective...his biggest legacy will be that he
opened the country’s economy to the world and brought the world to the country”
(Gjelten, 2006).
While those who praise the dictator claim Chile’s successes can be attributed
to its economic policies, it is rare to hear about Chile’s longstanding democratic
tradition when citing the country’s accomplishments. Chile is an interesting case
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study because of its recent and contemporary history of a strong democratic system.
Before the coup of 1973, Chile had a resilient political system built on legalism and
multi-party competition (Stern, 2006). During the 1950s and 1960s, Chileans had a
voter turnout of about 80 percent in national elections, whereas in the United States
it was around 50-60 percent during the same time period (Skidmore and Smith,
2010). Electoral results were seen as binding by most of the Chilean populace and
the military had a tradition of professionalism and respecting civilian rule (Skidmore
and Smith, 2010). This democratic base is unique in Latin America and makes the
wide support for Pinochet more astonishing. It is hard to study whether Chile’s
democratic tradition is important to its present stability, but it is often dismissed
too quickly by supporters of the dictator (Angell, 1993). While understanding what
makes Chile a relatively stable Latin American country is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is an important debate to take into account when trying to understand
what drives people to support Pinochet.
It is surprising that Pinochet was able to remain in power as a dictator in a
country that was so politically mobilized. Not much literature exists attempting to
explain how Pinochet was able to remain in power for those sixteen years. One theory,
posited by Jane Esberg, is that Pinochet’s regime relied on both a support base and
oppression (Esberg, 2018). She claims that in order to stay in power, Pinochet
created the perception of an imminent communist threat that his government was
working to keep at bay (Esberg, 2018). She references data showing that following
the 1982 financial crisis, repression in high support areas increased. Her theory relies
on an assumption that threat drives support for authoritarian leaders who make the
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people believe a dictatorship can protect them. If this theory is correct, then those
who support order and authority over liberty should support authoritarians, in this
case Pinochet. There should also be a relationship between seeing crime as one of
the main issues in Chile and supporting Pinochet.
Another theory is anecdotally explored by Tina Rosenberg. In Tina Rosenberg’s
1992 book, she depicts how the democratic opposition to Pinochet’s regime was
dormant for the years of his dictatorship (Rosenberg, 1992). She argues that Chileans
were afraid of speaking out and instead were waiting for a legal and political end
to the dictatorship. She tells the story of a man named Jaime Pe´rez. Pe´rez was
an Allende supporter whose friends were tortured, murdered, and abducted when
Pinochet came to power. Pe´rez himself went into hiding until he felt it was safe to
return to his normal life. With the economic boom, he was able to provide for his
family and thought of Pinochet in a positive light until the economic downturn of
1982. The story of Pe´rez illustrates Rosenberg’s point that people in Chile were tired
of the chaos of the Allende presidency and instead were willing to tolerate Pinochet’s
repression in exchange for order, security, and economic stability (Rosenberg, 1992).
Thus, Rosenberg cites order, security, and economic stability as the key reasons
people support Pinochet.
Following the test methodology put forth by Seligson and Tucker (2005), I look at
whether a person’s support for Pinochet in Chile can be predicted by their preference
for authoritarianism. In their study, Seligson and Tucker (2005) use data from both
Bolivia and Russia. In both cases they conclude that voters are motivated in their
support for authoritarian leaders by a preference for non-democratic systems. Their
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work is intriguing because they find this support for authoritarianism in both coun-
tries even though they are demographically, historically, and politically different. I
am examining the case of Chile to see if their results generalize further.
Using a similar methodology, I investigate whether preference for authoritarian-
ism predicts support for Pinochet. I also consider demographic factors such as age,
gender, education, and socioeconomic status and see whether they correlate with
support for the dictator. In analyzing these demographic variables, I am testing
whether economic and social status predict support for this particular authoritarian.
I measure whether support for Pinochet can be predicted by a person’s concern for
unemployment, crime, or corruption. In looking at unemployment, I will be studying
whether having pressing economic needs affects support Pinochet. By using a concern
for crime and a concern for corruption as variables, I will be investigating whether
these security concerns are drivers of support for authoritarianism. I extend their
analysis by also looking into the factors that predict support for authoritarianism.
6 Data
To study support for Pinochet, I analyze national public opinion surveys conducted
by the Centro de Estudios Pu´blicos (Center of Public Studies), a Chilean think
tank. The sample consists of adult residents (18 years and older) of Antofagasta,
Valparaiso, Vin˜a del Mar, Gran Santiago, Concepcion, and Talcahuano. These six
cities made up about half of Chile’s population in the years the surveys were being
conducted. The survey data is only gathered from urban areas and surveys are
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the 1988 Survey Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Order 2,825 0.314 0.464 0 0 1 1
Liberty 2,825 0.243 0.429 0 0 0 1
Economy 2,825 0.442 0.497 0 0 1 1
Pinochet 2,825 0.455 0.498 0 0 1 1
Age1 2,825 0.230 0.421 0 0 0 1
Age2 2,825 0.257 0.437 0 0 1 1
Age3 2,825 0.177 0.382 0 0 0 1
Age4 2,825 0.150 0.357 0 0 0 1
Age5 2,825 0.099 0.299 0 0 0 1
Age6 2,825 0.086 0.280 0 0 0 1
NotHighSchoolGrad 2,825 0.527 0.499 0 0 1 1
HighSchoolGrad 2,825 0.241 0.428 0 0 0 1
HigherEducation 2,825 0.232 0.422 0 0 0 1
ABC1 2,825 0.098 0.297 0 0 0 1
C2C3 2,825 0.493 0.500 0 0 1 1
DE 2,825 0.408 0.492 0 0 1 1
Gender 2,825 0.502 0.500 0 0 1 1
conducted in Spanish. The first survey I use was carried out in December of 1988,
two months after the plebiscite that voted Pinochet out of power. The second survey I
use was conducted in September and October of 1991, months after the release of the
Ritter Report, which documented the human rights abuses of the Pinochet regime.
The survey from 1999 was conducted in September and October, 11 months after
Pinochet was indicted in Spain for human rights violations. While the surveys are
slightly different between years, I attempt to standardize the coding in order to make
up for those differences.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the 1991 Survey Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Gender 1,174 0.398 0.490 0 0 1 1
Pinochet 1,174 0.199 0.400 0 0 0 1
Authority 1,161 2.565 1.247 1.000 1.500 3.500 7.000
ABC1 1,174 0.037 0.190 0 0 0 1
C2 1,174 0.138 0.345 0 0 0 1
C3 1,174 0.531 0.499 0 0 1 1
D 1,174 0.282 0.450 0 0 1 1
E 1,174 0.012 0.109 0 0 0 1
Age1 1,174 0.188 0.391 0 0 0 1
Age2 1,174 0.244 0.430 0 0 0 1
Age3 1,174 0.201 0.401 0 0 0 1
Age4 1,174 0.149 0.356 0 0 0 1
Age5 1,174 0.118 0.322 0 0 0 1
Age6 1,174 0.100 0.300 0 0 0 1
NotHighSchoolGrad 1,174 0.547 0.498 0 0 1 1
HighSchoolGrad 1,174 0.256 0.437 0 0 1 1
HigherEducation3 1,174 0.197 0.398 0 0 0 1
Unemployment 1,174 0.181 0.715 0 0 0 3
Crime 1,174 1.365 1.495 0 0 3 3
7 Methods
To measure support for the authoritarian, I use the questions in each survey that
ask directly about the respondents’ opinion of Pinochet. In the 1988 survey, the
participants are asked to rate their support for Pinochet from 1-7 (one being the
worst and 7 the best) or fill in a 9 if they do not know of him. Of the 3030 people
surveyed, I excluded 154 for filling in a 9. I code support for Pinochet in a binary
fashion, with 5,6, and 7 code as 1 (support) and 1,2,3, and 4 code as 0 (no support).
The proportion of people who are coded as supporting Pinochet under this binary
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for the 1988 Survey Data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Gender 1,268 1.562 0.496 1 1 2 2
WealthIndex 1,268 0.503 0.269 0.000 0.300 0.700 1.000
WealthIndex2 1,268 0.198 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.875
Pinochet 1,268 0.264 0.441 0 0 1 1
Authority 1,268 0.491 0.500 0 0 1 1
Corruption 1,268 0.073 0.260 0 0 0 1
Unemployment 1,268 0.527 0.499 0 0 1 1
Crime 1,268 0.417 0.493 0 0 1 1
NotHighSchoolGrad 1,265 0.591 0.492 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
HighSchoolGrad 1,265 0.221 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
HigherEducation 1,265 0.188 0.391 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Age1 1,268 0.134 0.341 0 0 0 1
Age2 1,268 0.218 0.413 0 0 0 1
Age3 1,268 0.219 0.414 0 0 0 1
Age4 1,268 0.162 0.368 0 0 0 1
Age5 1,268 0.124 0.330 0 0 0 1
Age6 1,268 0.143 0.350 0 0 0 1
is .337, which is lower than the proportion of people who voted to keep Pinochet
in power in the plebiscite (.44). Adding the group of people who said they neither
like nor dislike Pinochet (those who selected number 4) to the grouping of support
increases the proportion of people in the support group to .454. While this is closer
to the proportion of actual votes for Pinochet in the Plebiscite, I have decided to
code 4 (neither like nor dislike) as a 0 (lack of support) because in this analysis I
want to investigate the correlates of stated certain support of Pinochet. In the 1991
survey, the participants are asked to rate their opinion of Pinochet on a scale of 1-5
(1 being the worst and 5 the best) and 31 people are excluded from this analysis for
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selecting the option to not respond. Of the 1206 respondents, 19.91% are coded as
1 for rating their support for the dictator at a 4 or 5, which is high. The survey
question from 1999 asking about Pinochet is scaled in the same way as the one from
1991. Of the 1504 respondents, 138 are excluded for not selecting a value of 1-5 and
26.35 percent of them are coded as 1 for supporting Pinochet because they selected
4 or 5.
The variable coding support for authoritarianism varies slightly each year. The
question included in the survey from 1988 that asks about a preference for authority
over liberty also includes options relating to the economy. That is, the participants
were asked to select the most important issue facing Chile and the options divided
into three categories: economic concerns, concerns about a lack of order, and con-
cerns about lack of liberties. The variables are then coded as three binomial variables
(Order, Liberty, and Economy) where a 1 denotes that the respondent selected the
variable of choice as his or her her main issue of concern. A zero denotes that the
respondent selected one of the other two variables as his or her main issue of con-
cern. The question from survey year 1991 consists of four subsections that indirectly
measure whether the participants feel that authority is sometimes more important
than individual liberties. The questions ask the participants to rate on a scale of 1-7
whether they agree more with statements that seem to support the right of govern-
ments to establish their authority at the expense of liberties or whether they believe
individual rights should not be infringed upon by the government. The following is
an example:
Liberty Option: Es mejor un gobierno que consulte la opinio´n de todos los sectores
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y busque consenso (A government that consults the opinion of all the sectors and
seeks a consensus is better)
Authority/Order Option: Es mejor un gobierno que imponga su voluntad (A
government that imposes its will is better)
The variable Authority/Order is coded as an index of all four of such questions
posed and analyzed as a continuous variable. Having a lower index value indicates a
preference for a liberty options and having a higher one indicates a preference for the
order and authority options. The variable Authority/Order in 1999 is coded using
a question asking whether the participant prefers order and authority, liberty, both,
or neither. I exclude the participants that said neither and code Authority/Order as
a binomial variable, with those who selected order and authority as 1 and those who
said liberty or both as 0.
Gender is coded as a binary variable, with 1 being male and 0 female. The age
variable is split into six groups coded as binomial variables in all three surveys. The
age groupings are as follows: Age1 = 18-24; Age2 = 25-34; Age3 = 35-44; Age4 =
45-54; Age5 = 55-64; Age6 = 65 and older. For the purposes of this analysis, the
regression constant absorbs the value of the sixth age group. As such, all coefficients
are depicted in relation to this sixth age group’s predicted coefficient.
The variable accounting for socioeconomic status is divided into categories in
1988 and 1991 and coded continuously in 1999. In the survey from 1988, SES is split
up into three groupings. The first, which is coded as binomial variable ABC1, is high
SES and is made up of people in the group ABC1. The second, coded as binomial
variable C2C3, is middle SES and includes people in groups C2 and C3. The third,
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coded as binomial variable DE, is low SES and includes people in SES groups D and
E. The 1991 survey defines the categories for SES as five distinct groupings: ABC1,
C2, C3, D, and E. I then code the variables to match the ones from the 1988 survey
and are thus divided into ABC1, C2C3, and DE. For the analysis of survey year 1988
and 1991, the regression constant absorbs the value of SES3. As such, all coefficients
are depicted in relation to this SES group’s predicted coefficient. The survey from
1999 does not divide the subjects into discrete socioeconomic classes, and thus SES is
approximated through a wealth index. I compiled two wealth indexes as continuous
variables. The WealthIndex variable includes having a refrigerator, a microwave, a
compact disc, a telephone, a water heater, a washing machine, a color TV, video
equipment, a computer, and a vehicle. WealthIndex2 includes owning a credit card
for a business, a bank credit card, a savings account, a checking account, a cellular
phone, a maid, and a chauffeur.
To ask for respondents’ educational attainment, all three surveys inquired about
their number of years of schooling. I divided the variable quantifying education into
three binomial categories for each of the three surveys. NotHighSchoolGrad is coded
as a 1 for anyone who completed 11 or fewer years of schooling. HighSchoolGrad is
coded as a 1 for anyone who completed 12 years of schooling. HigherEducation is
coded as a 1 for those who completed more than 12 years of schooling. For the pur-
poses of this analysis the regression constant absorbs the value of HigherEducation.
As such, all coefficients are depicted in relation to this educational group’s predicted
coefficient.
The variables Unemployment, Crime, and Corruption are taken from a question
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asking the respondents what the three most pressing issues are that Chile is facing.
The 1988 survey does not include a question that could be used to quantify this
variable. The survey from 1991 does not include corruption as an option, but Crime
and Unemployment were coded as binomial variables. The survey from 1999 included
all three variables and I code them binomially. I will refer to the collection of these
variables as “issue variables” for the purposes of this analysis.
Using the variables defined above, I am studying the determinants of support
for Pinochet by estimating the correlations and partial correlations using the survey
data. In particular, this equation (Equation A) was estimated in the following form:
SupportP inocheti = α + β1 ∗ PreferAuthority/Orderi + β2 ∗ SESi + β3 ∗Xi + i
SupportP inochet is an indicator taking a value of 1 if person i supports Pinochet
α is the intercept
PreferAuthority/Order is a variable describing a preference for authority/order
over liberty in Chilean government and society
SES describes the socioeconomic status of person i
X is the set of control variables, including education, age, gender, and a concern
over unemployment, crime, or corruption as the main issue facing Chile
The following equation (Equation B) is then considered to study the determ-
inants of preference for authority/order by estimating the correlations and partial
correlations using the survey data.
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Authority/Orderi = α + β1 ∗ SESi + β2 ∗Xi + i
Authority/Order is an indicator taking a value of 1 if person i supports authority
and order over liberty
α is the intercept
SES describes the socioeconomic status of person i
X is the set of control variables, including education, age, gender, and a concern
over unemployment, crime, or corruption as the main issue facing Chile.
8 Results and Discussion
Looking at the overall data of stated support for Pinochet reveals some surprising
patterns. I expected support for Pinochet to be the highest in 1988 and lowest in
1999. This is because in 1988, Pinochet had just been voted out of power, but still
retained a sizeable support base. Further, the report detailing his human rights
abuses had not yet been compiled. I believed 1999 would show the lowest support
for Pinochet since by then, the public was widely aware of the atrocities committed
under his regime and he had even been indicted. This was not the case. The
highest support for Pinochet is reported in 1988, where it later decreases in 1991
and rebounds in 1999, but remains lower than the support held in 1988 (see Figure
1a). The levels of support reported in 1988 and 1991 were unsurprising. When the
Chilean people voted Augusto Pinochet out of power, they did so with around 56
percent of the vote; the vote in favor of Pinochet was over 40 percent and the voter
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(a) Comparative Support for Pinochet
(b) Support for Pinochet in 1988
(c) Support for Pinochet in 1991 (d) Support for Pinochet in 1999
Figure 1: Comparing Support for Pinochet
Support for Pinochet is highest in 1988 and lowest in 1991, with a surprising resur-
gence of support in 1999. Further, like and dislike for Pinochet becomes less extreme
from 1988 to 1999.
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turnout for the plebiscite was around 97 percent. These numbers are consistent with
the reported support in 1988, as shown in Figure 1b. In February of 1991, the Rettig
Report, signed by President Aylwin, was released. The report chronicled the human
rights abuses that were committed under Augusto Pinochet and the military junta.
Thus, the decline in Pinochet’s popularity in September, which is when the survey
from 1991 was conducted, is consistent with the investigation into his crimes against
the people of Chile.
In light of historical events, the rebound of support for Pinochet seen in 1999 is
surprising. In 1998, Augusto Pinochet was indicted in Spain for the human rights
violations that were carried out under his regime. This indictment makes us question
the reasons for his resurgence in popularity among the people surveyed in 1999. I
propose a couple of possible explanations. One possible interpretation is that the
people of Chile were enraged that Pinochet was being held in a foreign country
(England), which increased sympathy for him. An alternative explanation is that
as time passed, the memory of repression and how it affected the people of Chile
faded. A third possible reason for the resurgence of support for Pinochet is a feeling
of nostalgia for a regime that was, for the most part, economically stable.
Another expected result is that the proportion of people who chose the option
of neither supporting nor denouncing Pinochet increased with time. With each sur-
vey year, the distribution of peoples’ support began to take the shape of a normal
distribution. That is, a smaller proportion of people were rating their support as
extremely high or extremely low. In 1988, more than 30 percent of respondents
stated an extreme dislike of Pinochet (Figure 1b). This is consistent with a political
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climate in which Pinochet had just been voted out of office, presumably by the very
people who would rate their support for him as either extremely or very low. In 1991,
Patricio Aylwin was already president and despite the release of the Rettig report,
the proportion of people that reported the lowest, level 1, support for Pinochet had
decreased (Figure 2c). Simultaneously, the proportion of people who neither like nor
dislike Pinochet doubled from .116 in 1988 to .227 in 1991. This trend continued
with the 1999 data shown in Figure 1d. The people surveyed in 1999 had the lowest
proportion of people who responded with the most extreme numbers (1 and 7 in 1988
and 1 and 5 in 1991 and 1999) and the highest proportion of people in the exact
middle. As time passed after the removal of Pinochet, the opinions that people had
of his regime, either positive or negative, became less extreme. Presumably, this
happened as Pinochet became more irrelevant in Chile’s political scene and therefore
faded in the minds of Chilean citizens.
8.1 Preference for Order and Authority Drives Support for
Pinochet
My results are in strong disagreement with the theories of democratic backsliding
that emphasize economic or political concerns as the drivers of support for author-
itarians. Instead, my analysis shows that preference for authority and liberty on an
ideological level is crucial in predicting support for Pinochet. In every survey year
that I used, preferring order and authority over liberty is significantly correlated
with support for Augusto Pinochet to a .01 level. That relationship is strong even
when controlling for demographic variables and issue variables. The regression using
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Table 5: Preference for Authority Over Liberty Predicts Support for Pinochet in
1988
Dependent variable:
Pinochet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Authority 0.280∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.285∗∗∗ (0.020)
Liberty −0.218∗∗∗ (0.022) −0.215∗∗∗ (0.022)
Economy
ABC1 0.057 (0.035) 0.083∗∗ (0.033)
C2C3 0.037∗ (0.020) 0.034∗ (0.020)
DE
Age1 −0.027 (0.036)
Age2 0.028 (0.035)
Age3 0.034 (0.036)
Age4 −0.014 (0.037)
Age5 0.009 (0.040)
Age6
NotHighSchoolGrad −0.029 (0.025) −0.040∗ (0.023)
HighSchoolGrad −0.028 (0.026) −0.043 (0.027)
HigherEducation
Gender −0.041∗∗ (0.017)
Constant 0.434∗∗∗ (0.043) 0.418∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.019)
Observations 2,825 2,825 2,825 2,825
R2 0.150 0.143 0.003 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.142 0.002 0.0005
Residual Std. Error 0.460 (df = 2812) 0.461 (df = 2822) 0.498 (df = 2822) 0.498 (df = 2822)
F Statistic 41.242∗∗∗ (df = 12; 2812) 235.228∗∗∗ (df = 2; 2822) 3.572∗∗ (df = 2; 2822) 1.697 (df = 2; 2822)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows the estimates of Equation A. With or without controls, preference
for authority is the strongest predictor of support for Pinochet, both in magnitude
and statistical significance. The relationship between support for Pinochet and the
demographic variables SES and Education is weak. There is no relationship between
Age and support for Pinochet.
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Table 6: Preference for Authority Over Liberty Predicts Support for Pinochet in
1991
Dependent variable:
Pinochet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Authority 0.082∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.009)
ABC1 0.059 (0.064) 0.074 (0.064)
C2C3 0.065∗∗ (0.026) 0.064∗∗ (0.026)
DE
Age1 −0.124∗∗∗ (0.046)
Age2 −0.103∗∗ (0.044)
Age3 −0.038 (0.045)
Age4 −0.081∗ (0.046)
Age5 −0.049 (0.049)
Age6
NotHighSchoolGrad −0.018 (0.033) 0.009 (0.031)
HighSchoolGrad 0.069∗∗ (0.034) 0.083∗∗ (0.035)
HigherEducation
Gender −0.028 (0.023)
Unemployment 0.008 (0.016)
Crime 0.018∗∗ (0.008)
Constant −0.004 (0.060) −0.006 (0.026) 0.154∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.173∗∗∗ (0.026)
Observations 1,161 1,161 1,174 1,174
R2 0.091 0.063 0.005 0.007
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.062 0.004 0.005
Residual Std. Error 0.384 (df = 1147) 0.388 (df = 1159) 0.399 (df = 1171) 0.399 (df = 1171)
F Statistic 8.874∗∗∗ (df = 13; 1147) 77.454∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1159) 3.217∗∗ (df = 2; 1171) 4.110∗∗ (df = 2; 1171)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows the estimates of Equation A. With or without controls, preference
for authority is the strongest predictor of support for Pinochet, both in magnitude
and statistical significance. The relationship between support for Pinochet and the
demographic variables SES and Education is weak. The relationship between Age
and support for Pinochet is strong, with younger ages associated with less support.
Choosing crime as an issue variable is also correlated with support for Pinochet.
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Table 7: Preference for Authority Over Liberty Predicts Support for Pinochet in
1999
Dependent variable:
Pinochet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Authority 0.149∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.159∗∗∗ (0.024)
WealthIndex 0.087 (0.064) 0.075 (0.061)
WealthIndex2 −0.033 (0.083) −0.090 (0.080)
Age1 −0.065 (0.048)
Age2 −0.061 (0.043)
Age3 −0.045 (0.043)
Age4 −0.038 (0.045)
Age5 0.053 (0.047)
Age6
NotHighSchoolGrad 0.034 (0.041) 0.041 (0.033)
HighSchool −0.034 (0.041) −0.041 (0.039)
HighSchoolGrad
Gender −0.011 (0.025)
Corruption 0.107∗∗ (0.048)
Unemployment 0.016 (0.025)
Crime 0.054∗∗ (0.025)
Constant 0.150∗∗ (0.074) 0.186∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.248∗∗∗ (0.028)
Observations 1,265 1,268 1,268 1,265
R2 0.055 0.033 0.001 0.006
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.032 −0.0003 0.004
Residual Std. Error 0.431 (df = 1250) 0.434 (df = 1266) 0.441 (df = 1265) 0.440 (df = 1262)
F Statistic 5.243∗∗∗ (df = 14; 1250) 42.562∗∗∗ (df = 1; 1266) 0.831 (df = 2; 1265) 3.723∗∗ (df = 2; 1262)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows the estimates of Equation A. With or without controls, prefer-
ence for authority is the strongest predictor of support for Pinochet, both in mag-
nitude and statistical significance. The relationship between support for Pinochet
and the demographic variables SES (coded as the wealth index), Education, and Age
is nonexistent. Choosing crime or corruption as an issue variable is also correlated
with support for Pinochet, while choosing unemployment is not.
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the data from 1988 shows a significant negative correlation to the .01 significance
between the indexed preference for liberty and support for Pinochet. It also shows a
significant positive correlation to the .01 significance between the indexed preference
for liberty and support for Pinochet. The 1991 and 1999 results show an equally sig-
nificant relationship, .01, between stated support for Pinochet and indexed support
for authoritarianism.
On the other hand, the relationships between the demographic variables and
predicted support for Pinochet are weak and inconsistent. I do not see any consistent
effects of demographic variables, even when removing the controls and testing each
demographic variable and its predictive value individually.
Socioeconomic status has a different relationship with support for Pinochet in
each of the data sets. Looking at socioeconomic status, the data from 1988 and
1991 suggest that people who belong to the middle or upper socioeconomic class
are more likely to support Pinochet. With controls added, in the 1988 data that
relationship is statistically significant only for group C2C3 in relation to group DE
and only at a .1 level of significance. Without controls, the ABC1 (at the .05) and the
C2C3 groups (at the .1 level) are more likely compared to the DE group to support
Pinochet. In 1991, compared to the people of the lowest socioeconomic status, people
of the higher ones were also more likely to support Pinochet. The relationship
between support for the dictator and belonging to the middle socioeconomic group
was statistically significant to the .05 level with and without controls. The wealth
indexes used in the 1999 data-set did not prove to be statistically significant. That
means that socioeconomic status was not predictive of support for Pinochet in the
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1999 data. Thus, there seems to be some weak and inconsistent data supporting
a socioeconomic role in predicting support for Pinochet, mostly in the data from
1988 and 1991. Those results are not as striking and consistent as the relationship
between an authority/order preference and support for Pinochet described above.
Another demographic variable that is not consistently predictive of support for
Pinochet is education. Looking at the 1988 data, no educational group correlates
with support for Pinochet with controls. Without controls, not graduating high
school correlates negatively to the .1 level of significance with support for Pinochet.
For 1991, graduating high school but not moving on to secondary education was
significantly correlated with support for Pinochet at the .05 level of significance. This
was true in both the absence and presence of controls. The data from 1999 does not
show a relationship between support for Pinochet and education, with or without
controls. Overall, in 1991, not graduating high school correlates with expressing low
support for Pinochet without controls; in 1999, graduating high school correlates
with support for Pinochet. Education is, therefore, not a consistent predictor of
support for Pinochet.
The relationship between age and support for Pinochet is also inconsistent across
surveys. The data in 1988 does not show a significant relationship between any
group and support for Pinochet. In the 1991 data, young age appears to correlate
negatively with support for Pinochet; those in age groups 1 and 2, representing the
youngest age groups, have the most significant negative coefficients. That means
that, compared to the oldest people surveyed, the younger ones are less likely to
support Pinochet. The data from 1999 is similar to the one from 1988 in that none
42
of the age groups significantly predict support for Pinochet. There does not seem to
be a general trend of age predicting support for Pinochet, with only the results from
1991 showing some significant negative correlation between the variables.
Looking at the issue variables presents some intriguing results. Choosing crime
as one of the most pressing issues facing Chile is a consistent predictor of support for
Pinochet. Both data from 1991 and 1999 shows a significance to the .05 level in the
relationship between the variable crime and support for Pinochet. The issue variable
corruption, which is only quantified in the 1999 data set, correlates with support
for Pinochet at the .05 level of significance. I propose that both the crime and
corruption variables correlating with support for Pinochet can likely be attributed to
the fact that a military dictatorship is associated with an increase in law and order to
combat crime rates and corruption. Being scared of crime and impunity might lead to
supporting authoritarian leaders that promise to use a heavy hand against criminals
and corrupt leaders. The surprising result in analyzing the issue variables is that
there is no relationship between support for Pinochet and choosing unemployment
as the answer to the pressing issue question. Authoritarian governance, especially
in the case of Pinochet, is associated with heavy handed economic policies that
can sometimes lead to rapid growth. Economic instability seems like a candidate
reason for why people would support authoritarian leaders. However, the fact that
a concern for unemployment is not associated with support for Pinochet suggests
that this economic dimension was not the most important one in deciding to support
the dictator. Crime and corruption as issue variables seem to predict support for
Pinochet, but unemployment does not.
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Overall, support for Pinochet strongly correlates with prioritizing authority and
order over liberty. Support does not consistently correlate with any of the demo-
graphic variables that I analyzed. Believing crime and corruption to be some of
the most pressing issues in Chile also correlates with support for Pinochet; choosing
unemployment as a primary concern, surprisingly, has no relationship.
8.2 There is No Clear and Consistent Driver of Preference
for Authority and Order
The most striking result of this study is that the only variable that strongly predicts
support for Pinochet is preference for authority and order over liberty. It may sound
intuitive that people who support authoritarians also support authority, but what is
interesting is that preference for authority does not seem to be driven by demographic
or issue variables, either. Looking at a regression analysis of what variables predict
a preference for order and authority over liberty does not yield consistent results
across the discussed survey years.
At first glance, it appears that socioeconomic status might have an impact on
preference for authority and order since two of the three surveys show significant res-
ults relating to this demographic variable. Nonetheless, those results are inconsistent.
The data from 1988 shows a correlation to the .01 level of significance between pref-
erence for order and authority and the group ABC1. This correlation appears to
suggest that people belonging to the highest socioeconomic status groups are more
likely to support order and authority over liberty (and in the context of this particu-
lar survey year’s question, economic concerns). This would support theories claiming
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Table 8: 1988 Correlations Using Authority/Order as the Dependent Variable
Dependent variable:
Authority/Order
ABC1 0.092∗∗∗ (0.035)
C2C3 −0.005 (0.020)
DE
Age1 −0.001 (0.036)
Age2 0.036 (0.035)
Age3 0.043 (0.037)
Age4 −0.036 (0.037)
Age5 −0.013 (0.041)
Age6
NotHighSchoolGrad 0.027 (0.025)
HighSchoolGrad 0.004 (0.026)
HigherEducation
Gender −0.027 (0.018)
Constant 0.296∗∗∗ (0.043)
Observations 2,825
R2 0.008
Adjusted R2 0.004
Residual Std. Error 0.463 (df = 2814)
F Statistic 2.154∗∗ (df = 10; 2814)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows the estimates of Equation B. In 1988, belonging to the highest SES
group (ABC1) is the only variable that predicts preference for authority/order.
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Table 9: 1991 Correlations Using Authority/Order as the Dependent Variable
Dependent variable:
Authority/Order
ABC1 0.027 (0.207)
C2C3 −0.186∗∗ (0.084)
DE
Age1 0.159 (0.149)
Age2 0.031 (0.143)
Age3 0.127 (0.145)
Age4 −0.016 (0.150)
Age5 −0.068 (0.158)
Age6
NotHighSchoolGrad 0.105 (0.108)
HighSchoolGrad 0.003 (0.111)
HigherEducation
Gender −0.144∗ (0.075)
Unemployment 0.022 (0.052)
Crime 0.038 (0.025)
Constant 2.578∗∗∗ (0.178)
Observations 1,161
R2 0.016
Adjusted R2 0.006
Residual Std. Error 1.243 (df = 1148)
F Statistic 1.545 (df = 12; 1148)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows the estimates of Equation B. In 1991, belonging to the middle
SES group (C2C3) negatively correlates with preference for authority/order. No
issue variable (unemployment or crime) was a statistically significant predictor of
preference for authority/order.
46
Table 10: 1999 Correlations Using Authority/Order as the Dependent Variable
Dependent variable:
Authority/Order
WealthIndex 0.064 (0.073)
WealthIndex2 −0.009 (0.095)
Age1 −0.041 (0.056)
Age2 −0.008 (0.050)
Age3 0.044 (0.049)
Age4 −0.026 (0.051)
Age5 0.054 (0.054)
Age6
NotHighSchoolGrad 0.104∗∗ (0.046)
HighSchool 0.033 (0.046)
HighSchoolGrad
Gender 0.054∗ (0.028)
Corruption −0.078 (0.055)
Unemployment 0.022 (0.029)
Crime 0.141∗∗∗ (0.029)
Constant 0.238∗∗∗ (0.084)
Observations 1,265
R2 0.036
Adjusted R2 0.026
Residual Std. Error 0.494 (df = 1251)
F Statistic 3.593∗∗∗ (df = 13; 1251)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows the estimates of Equation B. In 1999, not graduating high school
correlates with preference for authority/order. Crime was the only issue variable
that was a statistically significant predictor of preference for authority/order.
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that authoritarian leaders are mainly supported and kept in power by elites.
The data from 1991 tells a different story. Analyzing the 1991 data, there ap-
pears to be a negative association between belonging to group C2C3 and supporting
authority using group DE as a frame of reference. That relationship is statistically
significant to the .05 level. That means that in this data set, being in a middle class
group made an individual less likely to support authority than an individual in the
lower classes. That, coupled with the lack of a significance for the ABC1 elite group
yields some contradicting results to those of the 1988 survey. In the analysis of the
1999 data, there is no relationship between authority and either of the WealthIndexes
used. The 1988 results suggesting that the elites prefer authority more so than any
other group are not replicated in 1991 or 1999. There is some evidence that there
could be a socioeconomic dimension to preference for authority, but my results are
too inconsistent to claim that effect is relevant or immutable.
Education is also an inconsistent predictor of support for order and authority.
In the data from 1988 and 1991, there is no relationship between any educational
attainment group and supporting authority over liberty. There is a relationship
between not graduating high school and supporting authority that is statistically
significant in the 1999 survey to the .05 level. What is interesting is that it is
the opposite of the trend seen with socioeconomic status. Those with the highest
income (only in the 1988 data) and those with the lowest education (only in the 1999
data) seem to be supporting authority more than other groups. These two results
contradict one another because, in theory and practice, those in higher socioeconomic
groups tend to be more educated. We would therefore expect more educated people
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to support authority based on the relationship between preference for authority and
high socioeconomic status. These results add more inconsistency to the attempt at
predicting preference for authority based on demographic variables.
There was no effect of age group on the likelihood of supporting authority over
liberty. This was surprising because it is often believed that older individuals are
more conservative (Truett, 1993), and conservative individuals, in turn, are more
authoritarian (Eckhardt, 1991).
The results about the effect of gender on preference for authority are inconsistent
but surprisingly significant in two of the years. In the 1988 data, there is no relation-
ship between the two variables. The results from 1991 and 1999 show a relationship
to the .1 significance level, but do so in opposite directions. The 1991 data suggests
a negative relationship being a male supporting authority. The 1999 data suggests
a positive relationship between being male and supporting authority. These results
add more inconsistency to the attempt to find the demographic drivers of preference
for authority and order.
The issue variables also give us some fascinating results. Unemployment does
not predict preference for authority, the same way that it did not predict support for
Pinochet. This is further evidence that support for authoritarianism is not entirely
a matter of economic preferences. A concern with corruption also does not predict
preference for authority. Being concerned with crime, nevertheless, does predict pref-
erence for authority, but only in one survey year. This relationship is significant to
the .01 level in 1999. This evidence might support the theory, albeit not strongly
because of the lack of significance in 1991, by Esberg (2018) who says that Pinochet
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maintained support in Chile by striking fear in his supporters of a potential commun-
ist takeover. By stoking fears of a communist uprising, Pinochet made his supporters
believe he was the only force that could protect them. For people who are concerned
with crime in Chile, it is likely that they believe an authoritarian leader would be
more adept at stymieing crime, even if it is through repressive policies. Thus, it is
likely they would feel safer under an authoritarian regime, and therefore value order
and authority over liberty. Of the issue variables, unemployment and corruption do
not drive preference for authority and order, and crime does so but only in 1999.
My results support Seligson and Tucker’s theory that attributes support for au-
thoritarianism to a preference for authority and order, which are characteristics of
non-democratic forms of government. Collectively, the results in this and the above
section consistently support that conclusion. The strongest predictor of support for
Pinochet in Chile seems to be preference for authority and order. The demographic
variables are not consistently correlated with support for Pinochet, with or without
controls. Of the issue variables, only crime and corruption are consistently correlated
with support for Pinochet. Those results are further strengthened by the regression
analysis looking at authority as the dependent variable. No variable strongly predicts
preference for authority and order consistently, which suggests that people might hold
an inherent preference for authority.
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9 Conclusion
This study investigates the roots of support for authoritarianism by focusing on
the case of Augusto Pinochet. From a democratic standpoint, it is shocking that
people would support leaders who have infringed on their democratic liberties. In
Latin America, countless actors involved in military dictatorships have thrived elect-
orally following their removal from power. Simultaneously, surveys such as Lat-
inobaro´metro suggest that support for democracy is not widespread in the region.
These factors taken together paint a bleak picture for the future of democratic sys-
tems in Latin America. Democracy cannot survive if people do not support its
institutions. It is crucial to understand why people would support authoritarianism
and attempt to use that knowledge to inform democratic policies.
Chile in particular has been a model Latin American country for its stability and
democracy following the election of Patricio Aylwin in 1990. Since then, its GDP
has trended upward and every president has been elected through a wholly demo-
cratic process. It is interesting to ponder how a country with a strong democratic
foundation gave rise to a brutal dictatorship that lasted for sixteen years. More in-
teresting still is that numerous Chilean citizens still praise Pinochet as a hero. The
deep division over Pinochet’s legacy is enduring and makes for a fascinating case
study.
My research addresses the factors that drive people to proclaim support for
Pinochet. In doing so I examine the fundamental question of whether the people
who support individual authoritarians also support authoritarianism over democracy.
The relevance of the question lies in that supporters of former authoritarians are
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littered across Latin America. If their electoral preferences are driven by a support
for non-democratic systems, then how can democracy thrive in the region?
In order to provide an answer for why people support authoritarianism, many
theorists focus on social or economic polarization. Svolik (2018) and Acemoglu et al.
(2013) propose a model in which political and economic polarization predict support
for authoritarian leaders and their policies. Through my analysis of survey data from
1988, 1991, and 1999, I find that a narrative relying on polarization is fundamentally
incomplete. I do not find socioeconomic status, age, educational attainment, or
gender to be consistently significant drivers of support for Pinochet. Additionally,
I do not find that concern for unemployment predicts support for Pinochet. This
finding contradicts an explanation of support for authoritarianism that emphasizes
financial concerns. Looking at people’s concern for crime and corruption and how
they affect support for Pinochet provides us with interesting preliminary findings.
Concerns over crime and corruption seem to predict support for Pinochet, but to a
lesser extent then preference for authority and order. Since the variable for corruption
is only included in one survey and the variable for crime in two, it is hard to make
strong conclusions about their effects. Further research is needed to see whether
concerns over crime and corruption drive support for authoritarians and whether
that finding generalizes to other countries.
My results imply that some people inherently prefer an authoritarian form of
government over a democratic one. I find that people who approve of Augusto
Pinochet also support policies that are more authoritarian. Across surveys, those
who state a preference for authority and order over liberty are more likely to support
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Pinochet. Since this effect is present when controlling for demographic variables and
issue variables, it seems people can prefer a form of government that infringes on
their liberties, as long as it provides them with order and security. This supports
the work of Seligson and Tucker (2005) in claiming that support for authoritarian
leaders reflects a widespread lack of support for democracy.
The relevant question now is, if demographic variables do not predict preference
for authority, then what does? In order to answer that question, I look at what
drives preference for authority and order over liberty and find no consistent results.
Thus, in this paper, I do not propose an answer to that question.
A next step would be to look into whether concerns over crime or corruption are
drivers of support for authoritarianism in other countries. Seligson and Tucker (2005)
find these issue variables to be relevant in their analysis, but the survey data available
does not fully allow me to confirm those results. These two variables are especially
relevant in Latin America given the high crime rates and corruption indexes. It would
also be interesting to look at other measures of economic uncertainty or of social
polarization to further test the aforementioned theories relying on those constructs.
Further research could also look at whether my results hold true in other countries.
There are a few limitations to this study. One is that looking at different years
and attempting to find consistent predictors of support for Pinochet obscures the
possible effect of year-specific variables. This is a difficult limitation to overcome
since political leaders do not operate in a vacuum. Another limitation is that since
the surveys are representative of the urban population of Chile, they do not take
into account the preferences of people living in the more rural areas of the country.
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Additionally, the questions are not entirely consistent across survey years. This is a
factor that could affect the consistency of the results and their ability to be compared
temporally. I attempt to control for the survey weaknesses in the study by coding the
variables uniformly in each data set. In order to correct these limitations, a further
study could use original survey questions that more specifically address the desired
variables. That would also allow for an analysis of the drivers of current support for
Pinochet.
Looking at Chile through a contemporary lens is especially relevant in the context
of the protests that arose against the right wing president, Sebastia´n Pin˜era, in 2019.
The protests surprised the world, since Chile is often looked at as Latin America’s
success story. The citizens of Chile were protesting the economic inequality that
decades of neoliberal policies have engendered. There is a wide wealth gap in the
country and numerous corruption scandals have eroded the people’s faith in the
government (Taub, 2019). The initial protests were sparked when the government
increased subway fare by four cents. With the rise in corruption of the democratically
elected government and the increasing economic polarization, it would be interesting
to see whether support for Pinochet and authoritarianism have increased in Chile.
Understanding why people support authoritarianism is a pressing policy issue.
From the rise of Cha´vez in Venezuela to that of Putin in Russia and Erdog˘an in
Turkey, governments around the world are becoming more authoritarian. By looking
at Latin America in the late twentieth century, we can study how authoritarianism
takes root and what can be done to stymie it. A main lesson to take from Chile is
not to reduce people’s preference for authoritarianism into matters of pure economic
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interest. While it is appealing to assume people are largely financially motivated,
it is also true that a concern for order could lead to supporting an authoritarian
government that can guarantee structure and safety. This study suggests that people
can support authority and order over liberty regardless of their demographics and
economic concerns. The idea that support for authoritarianism is not contained to
a single demographic group seems frightening for the prospects of democracy.
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